Approval of Take-out Mergers by Minority Shareholders: From Substantive to Procedural Fairness by van den Berg, Kent T
Approval of Take-out Mergers by
Minority Shareholders: From Substantive
to Procedural Fairness
Modern state corporation laws permit a majority shareholder to expel
minority shareholders by forcing them to accept an unnegotiated price for
their shares.' Dissident minority shareholders can seek injunctive relief,
rescission, damages, or a statutory appraisal.2 Courts, however, have been
1. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251,
253 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 902 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984); MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 71 (1979). The evolution of state merger statutes is traced by Balotti, The Elimination
of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General Corporation Law of
Delaware, I DEL. J. CORP. L. 63 (1976); Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Share-
holders, and Business Purposes, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 69; Weiss, The Law of Take Out
Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Weiss, Histori-
cal Perspective]; Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase
Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 254 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Weiss, Phase Six].
2. Because mergers are quickly executed and difficult to undo, preliminary injunctions and rescis-
sions are rarely granted. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) ("this long
completed transaction is too involved to undo"); Klein v. Soundesign Corp., Nos. 6636, 6643 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 21, 1982), reprinted in 7 Del. J. Corp. L. 332, 336 (1982) ("A preliminary injunction will
not issue unless a plaintiff has established a reasonable probability of ultimate success on final hearing
.... "); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) ("Rescission is the prefera-
ble remedy . . . [but] is not feasible at this late date. TransOcean has been merged into Esmark and
time has brought other corporate changes."). Whatever the initial form of the complaint, the plaintiff's
usual objective is rescissory damages, a remedy that requires defendant to pay plaintiff a pro rata
share of the gains actually realized from the merger as of the date judgment is entered. See id. The
Delaware appraisal remedy, as liberally construed by the court in Weinberger, permits rescissory
damages, despite the statutory language excluding "any element of value arising from the accomplish-
ment or expectation of the merger," DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983), provided that the gains
are not speculative. 457 A.2d at 714 (appraisal may include "elements of rescissory damages if the
Chancellor considers them susceptible of proof and a remedy appropriate to all the issues of fairness
before him"). In cases where the appraisal remedy does not by its terms apply (e.g., a tender offer or
a sale of assets, instead of a merger) or limits recovery (e.g., to pre-merger values), courts are increas-
ingly willing to expand it in the exercise of their equitable discretion. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp., 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979):
[A]though the Delaware Corporation Law makes no statutory provision for . . . damages
arising as a consequence of an alleged unfair offer of a parent corporation to buy the stock of
its subsidiary's minority stockholders for an inadequate consideration . . . I conclude that a
proceeding analogous to an appraisal hearing such as is provided for in merger cases is appro-
priate here.
Id. at 11. In Delaware, suits for breach of fiduciary duty are now subsumed by the appraisal hearing
and analogous judicial proceedings. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d at 714 (in cases where
appraisal is not adequate, "the Chancellor's powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and
monetary relief as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages"). Criticism of appraisal as a
limited or mechanical remedy is thus no longer warranted. For examples of such criticism applied to
the pre-Weinberger appraisal remedy, see Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. Rrnv. 297, 304-07 (1974); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Rem-
edy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964).
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unable to devise uniform methods of calculating a share's intrinsic value.'
Thus their opinions regarding the substantive fairness of take-out mergers
lack sufficient precedential force to guide corporate planning or to permit
dismissal of groundless suits before trial.4 No refinement of economic
analysis can solve this problem because even if a take-out were demon-
strably fair in some objective sense, it would still raise questions of fair-
ness when imposed on the minority against its will.5 Courts should aban-
don the effort to establish objective economic criteria of substantive
fairness in favor of the more modest but more workable goal of procedural
fairness: to safeguard free choice. Procedural fairness grounded in in-
formed decisionmaking provides a basis for adjudication more in keeping
with the policies of state merger statutes, the disclosure requirements of
federal securities regulation, and judicial competence.
This Note argues that a take-out merger is procedurally fair if it re-
quires an informed affirmative vote by a majority of the minority shares.6
3. "Intrinsic value," the underlying objective worth of a share, is the measure of a substantially
fair price. For the elements of intrinsic value, see Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523,
74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950). For an indication of the complexity of "intrinsic value," see Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1356-62 (Del. Ch. 1981) (comparative analysis and discounted cash flow
as competing methods of valuation), rev'd 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (rejecting as outmoded the
"Delaware block" or weighted average method of computing share value).
4. See generally Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 942 (1983) (Singer cases are departure from
prior case law); Weiss, Phase Six, supra note 1, at 258 (court, on its own volition, undertook to
review and overrule the Singer cases). Given the remarkable instability of judicial precedents in this
area, neither shareholders nor corporate managers can be certain of their rights and liabilities in
planning, contesting, or defending take-out mergers.
5. The unfairness of coercive take-outs is urged by Cary, Federalism and Corporate Lau': Reflec-
tions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), and Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 297.
These authorities may have persuaded the Delaware court, in Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969
(Del. 1977), to reject the position earlier taken in David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281
A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971):
[U]nder the law of merger each minority stockholder . . . has had at least constructive notice
that he may be lawfully eliminated as such a stockholder unless the plan of corporate reorgani-
zation designed to absorb his stock interest is so grossly unfair as to be invalid. . .[I]f plain-
tiffs and others are not satisfied with the value placed on their shares by [defendant], and no
fraud or blatant overreaching is demonstrated, their recourse is to an appraisal.
Id. at 35. Accord Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962); Federal United
Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331, 342 (1940). In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701,715 (Del. 1983), the court announced its "return to the well established principles" of these cases
"mandating a stockholder's recourse to the basic remedy of an appraisal." See supra note 2. It is not
possible to determine in the abstract whether the forced removal of minority shareholders is inherently
unfair, regardless of the price. Take-out mergers present conflicting equities that cannot be credibly or
consistently resolved by any substantive theory or principle. Hence this Note argues that the emphasis
of adjudication should shift from substantive to procedural fairness.
6. Several courts and commentators have considered minority approval, but they treat it as a
variant of ex post shareholder ratification of voidable corporate actions. This analysis overlooks the
importance of the minority's vote as a substitute for the otherwise coercive imposition of majority will
and instead seeks objective measures of fair price as the primary criteria of substantive fairness. Thus,
no court or commentator reaches the conclusion urged in this Note: that procedural fairness achieved
through minority approval is a better standard of equity than reliance on objective economic criteria of
intrinsic value and substantive fairness. The legal effect of minority approval was an issue "of first
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This Note argues further that both shareholders and courts should prefer
disclosure and free choice as better guides to an equitable result than ob-
jective indicators of intrinsic value. Minority approval of parent-subsidi-
ary mergers and "going-private" transactions invites courts to bring to
substantive state corporation law the rationale of disclosure underlying
federal securities regulations. The Note concludes with an analysis of the
benefits gained by all parties when take-out mergers are effected by mi-
nority approval.
I. STATE AND FEDERAL LAW OF TAKE-OUT MERGERS
State and federal courts approach take-out mergers from opposite direc-
tions. State courts, applying substantive state corporation law, judge the
substance of a transaction-in particular, its price-against objective mea-
sures of intrinsic value. In contrast, federal courts, applying federal securi-
ties regulations, leave substantive issues to state courts and limit their in-
quiry to the central procedural issue of disclosure. Both perspectives are
deficient. The substantive issues are too difficult for courts to resolve con-
sistently; the question of sufficient disclosure lacks substance in take-out
mergers, where the minority shareholders, certain to be outvoted, have no
meaningful choice to make.
A. State Law
State courts assessing take-out mergers give primary consideration to
price.' Although the Delaware Supreme Court divides the question of
impression" for the Delaware courts in 1979. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Del.
Ch. 1979). Minority approval was mentioned by Borden, Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort, or
No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987, 1039 (1974) (minority approval makes the equities of going pri-
vate transactions "much clearer"), but disapproved by Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 300,
333 ("[Tlhe process of seeking stockholder approval is skewed in favor of a vote for approval ....
[Minority] stockholders will accept a pittance which bears no relationship to any freely bargained
division of the premium."). The most extensive treatment occurs in an essay by Chazen, Fairness
from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the
Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAw. 1439, 1474-77 (1981) (minority shareholders will vote for a
second-best price lower than would be gained for them by an independent negotiator); see also Weiss,
Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 676-77 (only courts can determine the fairness of a merger
price because shareholders routinely follow management's recommendations, accept second best alter-
natives, and have fiduciary rights not subject to vote).
7. Courts have ruled that take-out mergers must have a valid business purpose as well as provide
stockholders a fair price. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1122-25 (Del.
1977); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 978-80 (Del. 1977). But courts are ill-equipped to second-
guess business judgments and generally excuse themselves from doing so by invoking the "business
judgment rule," according to which decisions within the scope of management's discretion are pre-
sumed to be valid. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 822-24 (1981) (market better able to police errors
in business judgment than courts). The Delaware court has recently discarded the business purpose
test on the ground that it has been "virtually interpreted out of existence." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (quoting Weiss, Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 671 n.300).
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fairness into a substantive aspect, "fair price," and a procedural aspect,
"fair dealing," the former is more important than the latter, save in cases
of outright fraud.8 Unfair dealing includes fraud, overreaching, hurried
transactions that deny directors an opportunity for careful deliberation,
lack of arm's-length negotiation with representatives of the minority
shareholders, and nondisclosure of the value the acquirer hopes to gain
from the transaction.' Unfair dealing is important insofar as it results in,
or conceals, an unfair price.
In determining whether a disputed price is fair, the Delaware Supreme
Court is willing to consider "any techniques or methods which are gener-
ally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise ad-
missible in court."10 But the elements of fair price, such as market value,
liquidation value, third-party sale value, benefits from synergy, and the
relative weight to be assigned to each, cannot be established by courts in a
consistent and predictable manner that will offer effective guidance to fu-
ture corporate behavior." Different methods of valuation "generally con-
sidered acceptable," such as comparative analysis and discounted cash
flow analysis, frequently produce contradictory indications of the "fair"
price."
Even if an objectively fair price could be determined, the consequences
of a take-out merger at that price would not be uniformly fair to each
Unfortunately, neither the court nor the commentators on whom it relied considered that a judicially
imposed obligation to demonstrate a valid business purpose could have been employed to require
corporate planners carefully to consider all alternative means of accomplishing their objective. While
it is unlikely that a corporation large enough to have publicly traded shares would undertake a major
reorganization merely as a subterfuge for eliminating the minority (for motives other than the permis-
sible business purpose of reducing costs), it might opt for a take-out because it seemed the quickest
and most obvious route, even though some other means might have been contrived to achieve the same
objectives. On the application of the business judgment rule by federal appellate courts, see Comment,
The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests for Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U.L.
REv. 980 (1982):
The courts have allowed the broad mantle of business judgment to obscure the inadequacy of
directorial investigation into all of the implications involved in pending control contests ....
[Shareholders'] interests can be protected only by increasing the level of judicial inquiry into
incumbent directors' performance of their duties, and by shifting the burden of proof to the
directors to show that implemented defensive tactics [against takeovers] are motivated by a
compelling corporate interest.
Id. at 1013-14.
8. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) ("in a non-fraudulent transaction
• ..price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the merger").
9. Id. at 711-12.
10. Id. at 713.
11. See Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standards of Fairness of Merger Tenns Under Delaware Law,
2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44, 50-64 (1977) (substantive fairness measured by market value, earnings value,
net asset value, comparative per share analysis, and valuation of debt, preferred stock, and convertible
securities); supra note 3.
12. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1356-62 (Del. Ch. 1981) rev'd on other
grounds 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (examination of expert testimony; conflicting assessments of intrin-
sic value ranging from $14 to $32 per share).
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minority shareholder, unless all of them had the same level of risk aver-
sion, the same assessment of the company's prospects, the same basis in its
stock, and the same portfolio of investments. 13 Experts disagree over the
variance in shareholder expectations, the propriety of including losses re-
sulting from adverse tax consequences or lack of portfolio diversification,
and the need to recognize other individual circumstances in assessing
fairness."'
Similar uncertainty surrounds any increases in value resulting from the
merger. The anticipated gains cannot be measured exactly; the variables
are too numerous and their interactions too complex.1 5 Even if the facts
were undisputed, there is no agreement as to what principle the court
should apply in determining a fair distribution of the merger gains. 6
Some have urged that minority shareholders, contributing nothing to the
merger except potential obstacles to its completion, are free-riders who
deserve none of the gains, 17 while others insist that they should receive the
"reservation price," which is the maximum the acquirer is willing to
pay.1" Given this lack of consensus, there is little likelihood that courts
will be able to reach consistent and reliable determinations of substantive
fairness.
Even if a merger price were shown to be objectively and uniformly fair,
it would not follow that it could be fairly imposed on the minority against
13. Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 977 n.8 (Del. 1977); Toms, Compensating Shareholders
Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 556 n.23 (1978).
14. See Toms, supra note 13. Compare Fischel, supra note 4, at 925 n.69 ("If one shareholder
valued shares at a higher price than the market price, this shareholder would long ago have purchased
the shares held by other shareholders. By this process of arbitrage, different values for the same
asset-the shares-would have been eliminated and an equilibrium price would be reached.") with
Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CA-
LiF. L. REV. 1072, 1076 n.10 (1983) ("The 'value' of an aliquot portion of the enterprise represented
by a share of its common stock may be said to depend not only upon the value of the enterprise, but
also upon the personal tax positions, portfolios, or other economic requirements of the individual
investors involved.").
15. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 393-95 (Del. Ch. 1979) (gains usually
impossible to ascertain, not shown to be in excess of premium offered to minority shareholders, and
excluded from consideration by state appraisal statute). But see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 713 (Del. 1983) ("But elements of future value. . . which are known or susceptible of proof as
of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation, may be considered."); Brudney, supra
note 14, 1104 n.93 ("Weinberger, in 'liberalizing' the relief available under the appraisal remedy,
implies some sort of sharing, but leaves the matter frightfully opaque.").
16. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35
STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus
Pure Passiz'itV in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982); Lorne, A Reappraisal of Fair
Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1978).
17. Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corpora-
lion, 11 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 42, 43 (1980).
18. Weiss, Phase Six, supra note 1, at 253 ("minimum measure of fair value in a take out merger
is the highest price that the controlling stockholder is prepared to pay to obtain complete ownership of
its subsidiary").
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its will. 9 Even though investors hold their shares subject to state corpora-
tion laws and corporate charters permitting take-out mergers, courts have
not always ruled in favor of controlling shareholders. Instead, by employ-
ing the doctrine that the majority owes a fiduciary obligation to the mi-
nority,20 courts have severely qualified the majority's statutory power to
cash-out the minority. The conflict between statutory power and equitable
obligation is further complicated by the tension between the controlling
shareholder's duty to the minority shareholders and its duties to the corpo-
ration it controls and its minority shareholders (if any), for whom the
merger may represent a valuable corporate opportunity." Standing on
both sides of the transaction, the controlling shareholder faces conflicting
obligations.22 This impasse can be resolved only by procedures that enable
the minority to protect its own interests, thereby reducing the controlling
shareholder's power in order to release it from responsibilities it cannot
fulfill.
19. See Tanzer, 402 A.2d at 391 ("To force a stockholder to accept an investment which he does
not want may be just as unfair as it is to force him to divest himself of an investment he is happy with
by requiring him to turn in his shares in a cash-out merger."). The controlling shareholder's power
under state merger statutes to cash out the minority is often likened to the power of eminent domain,
but the analogy is inconsistent with the concept of fiduciary duty. For the eminent domain analogy,
see Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 978 (Del. 1977); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24
Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940); Carney, supra note 1, at 70 n.5.
20. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts."); Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d at 976 ("the dominant corporation, as a majority stockholder standing on both
sides of a merger transaction, transaction has 'the burden of establishing its entire fairness' to the
minority stockholders, sufficiently to 'pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts"'). Despite Wein-
berger's express adherence to the Singer requirement that the defendant has "the burden of establish-
ing. . . [the take-out's] entire fairness," two commentators have interpreted Weinberger as a repudia-
tion of Singer. Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer,
39 Bus. LAw 1, 10 (1983) (under Weinberger, "[except in cases of fraud. . . a showing of fair price
without more will likely meet the majority's obligation . . . [and] appraisal should be considered a
complete remedy"). To the contrary, the court may not have intended to limit "entire fairness" to
"fair price." Weiss, Phase Six, supra note 1, at 258 ("shareholders who are able to demonstrate
unfairness in other aspects of the transaction [than price] will continue to have the ability to maintain
class actions").
21. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 705 (Del. 1983) (parent's directors "purport-
edly" kept in mind that parent "owed a fiduciary responsibility to both its own stockholders as well as
to [the subsidiary's] minority"). For the gains that the parent hoped to realize for its own sharehold-
ers, see id. at 708.
22. This impasse is illustrated by Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., in which the Dela-
ware Supreme Court confronted the issue "whether the parent may cause a merger to be made solely
for its own benefit, or whether that is a violation of fiduciary duty." 379 A.2d at 1123. The court
attempted to uphold both of these alternatives. It held that "each stockholder represents himself and
his own interests solely and in no sense acts as a trustee or representative of others." Id. at 1124
(quoting W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2031 (rev. perm.
ed. 1980)). But the court added that the shareholder's right to vote in his own interest was limited "by
any duty he owes to other stockholders," 379 A.2d at 1124, and remanded the case for judicial scru-




The disclosure requirements in federal securities regulations are more
clearly defined than obligations of fiduciary duty in state corporation
law."3 A sense of limited congressional purpose and limited jurisdiction
permeates many federal court decisions under the securities laws and cor-
roborates a more general sense of the limits of adjudication in the area of
corporate law.24 In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, the Supreme Court held
that courts should not place their own assessment of a merger's substan-
tive fairness above an informed vote by the participants.2" The Court held:
"There is no justification for presuming that the shareholders of every
corporation are willing to accept any and every fair merger offer put
before them. . . . [I]t is pure conjecture to assume that the fairness of the
proposal will always be determinative of their vote."2 6 The ruling left
substantive fairness to the determination of the parties and procedural
fairness to the determination of the courts.
Nothing similar to Mills has appeared in state cases to qualify a virtu-
ally unanimous reliance on judicial determinations of substantive fair-
ness.27 This neglect may stem from the fact that the Court in Mills had no
basis for emphasizing the importance of free choice other than the sup-
posed congressional purpose in enacting the Securities Exchange Act.2
Modern financial theory provides independent corroboration of the con-
gressional policy by indicating that an aggregation of independent assess-
23. The most important disclosure requirements bearing on issues raised by take-out mergers are
contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), and rules promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1982). Rule 10b-5 forbids deceptive and manipulative practices in the
purchase and sale of securities, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; rules promulgated under Rule 14 concern
disclosures required in proxy statements, C.F.R. § 240.14. Rule 13e-3, concerning going private
transactions, requires the acquirer to state whether he reasonably believes that the transaction is fair
or unfair to unaffiliated security holders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. This rule is the Securities and
Exchange Commission's most overt attempt to enforce substantive fairness indirectly through the
mechanisms of disclosure. See Note, Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1980) (item 8 goes beyond congressional intent and intrudes into areas tradi-
tionally governed by state law).
24. This sense of limits is especially noteworthy in opinions of the Supreme Court construing
Rule lob-5 (forbidding deceptive and manipulative conduct in the purchase or sale of securities) more
narrowly than urged by the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (complaint for fiduciary breach does not state a claim under Rule 10b-5 absent
deceptive and manipulative conduct; to rule otherwise would be to federalize corporation law and
override state policies); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("we are quite un-
willing to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975) (rule granting standing to sue under Rule lob-5 only to actual
purchasers or sellers upheld in order to discourage "vexatious" litigation).
25. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
26. Id. at 382-83 n.5.
27. Mills, if it had been considered at all, might have been distinguished as dealing with a stock-
for-stock reorganization, instead of a cash-out. But such a distinction would be undermined by the fact
that Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (1952), the precedent upon which the Singer
cases are overtly based, also involved a stock-for-stock reorganization.
28. 396 U.S. at 381.
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ments of a proposed transaction's value will be more accurate than any
single assessment, however expert.29 Share prices change in part because
investors, initially in the minority, discover genuinely new information
that becomes the basis for new prices. 0 The take-out merger substitutes a
single investment decision (the controlling shareholder's) for a series of
uncoordinated decisions by numerous investors that in the aggregate
would determine a more accurate price. Minority approval reestablishes a
market-like aggregation of choices within a single transaction. Accurate
information and the duty to disclose such information to minority share-
holders become far more important when these shareholders have power
to approve or reject the transaction than when the controlling shareholder
has unilateral power to ratify its own prior decision.
II. THE BENEFITS OF MINORITY APPROVAL
Minority approval helps in three ways to solve the nearly intractable
legal problems posed by take-out mergers. First, it facilitates adjudication
of disputed transactions by shifting the emphasis of judicial scrutiny from
fair price to free choice. Second, it mitigates the coerciveness of take-outs,
not only by protecting minority shareholders from ill-considered or exploi-
tive terms, but also by protecting the controlling shareholder (and its
shareholders) from meretricious legal actions. Finally, it encourages more
adequate valuation of a transaction by all of the participants.
A. Facilitating Adjudication
By providing a credible demonstration of a take-out's fairness, minority
approval should both reduce the number of groundless suits and make
those transactions which are litigated more amenable to judicial scrutiny.
While no court has accepted minority approval as establishing per se fair-
ness and exempting the transaction from judicial scrutiny, it is well settled
that approval by a majority of the minority shares does establish a rebut-
table presumption that the transaction was fair."1 Given the difficulty of
29. W. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION 159-60 (1981):
[P]rices act as an aggregation of everyone's information, such that the price "reflects" informa-
tion that is superior to that held by each and every individual .... [I]diosyncratic behavior,
by definition, is essentially uncorrelated among individuals. As a result, security prices, which
can be viewed as a "consensus" across investors, are effectively able to diversify away the large
idiosyncratic component . . . .By analogy, the individual investors' beliefs can be viewed as
akin to individual securities and the security price can be viewed as an aggregate akin to a
portfolio.
30. See R. Gilson & R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, Working Paper # 13,
Civil Liability Program, Yale Law School 24-25 (July 1983) (new information, even if trivial or
fragmented in itself, can have value by altering existing information upon which forecasts are based).
31. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (1983) ("where corporate action has been ap-
proved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders . . . burden entirely shifts to
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sustaining the burden of proof in the economic dimensions of a corporate
reorganization, 2 the effect of the presumption is to shift the gravamen of
complaints from the intrinsic fairness of the price to the adequacy of the
disclosures made to minority shareholders. 33 This development makes ad-
judication of disputed take-outs easier and more certain. Intrinsic
value-if it exists at all-is difficult to measure. By contrast, disclosure is
readily documented and verified. Moreover, the requirements of disclosure
and free choice are intuitively obvious: Shareholders must have all infor-
mation that a reasonably prudent investor would consider significant in
deciding how to vote.
Federal courts have held that information is material in securities regu-
lation "if there is i substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote."343 Nondisclosure of
material information is an offense in itself; a plaintiff need not prove that
shareholders were actually misled, or that the merger would not have
been approved had the defendant disclosed the information. 5
The rationale of this rule, however, is eroded in the case of a take-out
merger where the controlling shareholder has sufficient votes to carry the
transaction unilaterally. In such a case, a reasonable minority shareholder,
knowing that his vote can make no difference, might not consider any
information important in deciding which way to vote, and would probably
not vote at all.36 A federal court, assessing the materiality of an alleged
nondisclosure, would have to hypothesize the response of a reasonable
the plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority").
32. See supra pp. 1114-15.
33. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 ("burden clearly remains on those relying
on the vote to show that they completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction"); cf.
Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1982) (minority shareholders' approval of
the merger does not justify dismissal when plaintiff alleges that "public shareholders' approving votes
were 'coerced' through a materially false and misleading proxy statement"). If Weinberger is con-
strued as eliminating Singer's requirement of "entire fairness" (in addition to the "business purpose"
requirement) and relegating dissident shareholders (except those alleging outright fraud) to an ap-
praisal hearing, then controlling shareholders may eschew minority approval in order to limit the
scope of disclosure. See generally Berger & Allingham, supra note 20, at 23 ("Where the minority is
given the right to block the merger . . . the disclosures germane to the minority would appear to
include virtually all aspects of the corporation's operations, management, future plans, and prospects
as opposed to the more limited facts relating to value which would be material if the stockholders were
not empowered to prevent the merger, but had only fair-value rights."). It is questionable, however,
whether a court could distinguish "facts relating to value" from other "aspects of the corporation's
operations, management future plans, and prospects"; the court in Weinberger suggests that all such
information is "relevant" to an appraisal proceeding. 457 A.2d at 713. Moreover, the court in Wein-
berger expressly disavowed any intention to limit dissenting shareholders' equitable remedies.
34. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
35. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
36. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1027 (5th ed. 1982) (Materiality
"can only be given content by considering the question in the context of all the circumstances of the
transaction . . . . If the [plaintiff] has no choice in the matter, then no information is 'material' to
him.").
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shareholder whose vote could make a difference. By measuring material-
ity, the hypothetical vote has dispositive legal consequences, even though
the actual votes are immaterial. Courts have upheld this anomalous result
to preserve the indirect benefits of disclosure: informing the market about
the merger, inhibiting otherwise rapacious controlling shareholders, and
encouraging "private attorneys general" to seek enforcement of the securi-
ties laws.
37
Minority approval would bring the federal courts' hypothetically rea-
sonable investor to life and give "material" information an actual role to
play in the outcome of proposed take-out mergers. It would encourage
otherwise indifferent minority shareholders to make research investments
that (when aggregated by their vote) bring new information to the market.
And it would allow both federal and state courts, over time, to discover
concretely and in detail what information actually is material to share-
holders in a position to use it.
B. Mitigating Coercion
Take-out mergers are less coercive when the controlling shareholder al-
lows the minority shareholders to decide as a group whether the transac-
tion should be completed or not. Of course, even with minority approval
some coerciveness remains, since the controlling shareholder retains its
ability to set the proposed terms at a time of its own choosing and to
oblige the minority to make a decision. 8 Moreover, unless the vote is
unanimous, some shareholders will be forced to accept a transaction not to
their liking. But this coercion could be eliminated only at the cost of
granting each shareholder a veto, which ultimately would be even more
coercive.
The power of minority approval to mitigate coercion is best illustrated
by the response it allows to holdouts who will not accept any price for
their shares. Under minority approval, the coercion necessary to remove
holdouts will be exercised only by other minority shareholders who oc-
cupy the same position as the holdouts and who are willing to accept the
37. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 378 n.7, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1974)
(disclosure informs the market and restrains controlling shareholder; § 14(c) of 1934 Act requires
disclosure even for shareholder actions not solicited by proxies); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir. 1970) (shareholder functions as a private attorney general to assist
the SEC in enforcing § 14(a)).
38. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Del. Ch. 1979), re,'d on other grounds, 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) ("whenever a majority shareholder . . . undertakes to exercise an available
statutory power so as to impose the will of the majority upon the minority, such action gives rise to a
fiduciary duty on the part of the majority shareholder to deal fairly with the minority whose property
interests are thus controlled"); see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 307.
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offered terms, not by the controlling shareholder who proposes the terms
and who seeks to gain sole possession of the enterprise.
As minorities become smaller and more vulnerable, their power under
the proposed voting procedure would grow proportionately. The question
then arises whether majorities would be exploited by very small minorities
which could extort a high price for approval. This danger would be espe-
cially great in cases where a holder of the majority of the minority shares
is a former competitor for control in a tender offer-the result of a "two-
step" transaction. The first step is a tender offer; the second, a take-out
merger. Where the terms of the take-out are disclosed in the initial tender
offer, however, there is but one transaction for which the tender of shares
operates as a vote by holders not affiliated with the would-be acquirer.3 9
Hence a second minority vote to approve the take-out would be inappro-
priate in this special case.40
Parent-subsidiary and "going-private" transactions are distinguishable
from two-step mergers. While minority approval would allow a small
number of shareholders to block all three types of merger, the majority in
parent-subsidiary and going-private mergers is generally better able to ac-
commodate the minority by offering alternative consideration (e.g., stock
for stock) or by making repeated offers over time.
Moreover, in parent-subsidiary and "going-private" transactions, mi-
norities typically become small through "creeping acquisitions" by the
majority. This strategy, often condemned as evasive because it eludes reg-
ulation and judicial scrutiny,41 would be discouraged by a minority-ap-
proval voting procedure, because the risk of a negative vote would increase
as the minority grew smaller, less representative, and more unpredictable.
A prompt and forthright offer to a relatively large minority would then be
the preferable course-from the strategic as well as the equitable point of
view. In an extreme case, the majority would be required either to forgo
the transaction or to complete it without minority approval-and bear the
burden of proof if a minority shareholder sues. But in an extreme case, the
burden of proof would not be hard to bear.
39. Such two-step tender offers are construed as single transactions under Rule 13e-3, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 330-40.
40. Unfavorable consequences of requiring minority approval of the second step in a two-step
tender offer are analyzed by Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural
Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775, 784-85 n.41 (1982) (supermajority
charter provisions prompt offerors to acquire fewer shares in the first-round tender offer, leaving a
larger number of shareholders favoring the transaction "frozen in" until the second-round take-out
can be completed).
41. See Tobin & Maiwurm, Beachhead Acquisitions: Creating Wazes in the Marketplace and
Uncertainty in the Regulatory Framework, 38 Bus. LAW. 419 (1983); Atkins, Defense Against Creep-
ing Acquisitions, in THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 57 (1982).
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C. Improving Valuation
Minority approval would motivate minority shareholders to estimate
the value of the transaction because they would have power to determine
the outcome. Without minority approval, the controlling shareholder can
impose any price, so long as it is high enough to discourage minority
shareholders from exercising their statutory appraisal rights or bringing
suit for breach of fiduciary duty. But where the minority has power over
the transaction, the controlling shareholder must estimate what price a
reasonable shareholder will accept. The minority may then be prompted
to make an intelligent evaluation instead of responding with the apathetic
acquiescence that often characterizes shareholder ratification."' The mi-
nority shareholders face an important choice: to accept the offer and rein-
vest the cash in other ventures, or to reject it in hopes either that a higher
offer will be forthcoming or that the retained shares will increase in value.
The controlling shareholder can be reasonably certain of acceptance
only by offering a premium that exceeds not only the pre-merger market
price of the shares but also the estimated value of the future prospects-a
higher cash-out offer or continued participation-that the minority could
keep open by voting against the cash-out price. To succeed, therefore, the
controlling shareholder must distribute to the minority an amount at least
equal to its collective estimate of the future value of all potentially availa-
ble alternatives. Minority approval thus provides an equitable means to
distribute the anticipated gains from the transaction between the control-
ling and minority shareholders.
Courts and commentators have urged the appointment of independent
directors to bargain for the minority shareholders.4 Formal negotiations
between a majority shareholder and independent directors would increase
42. Brudney and Chirelstein forcefully argue that ex post shareholder ratification has little signifi-
cance in demonstrating the fairness of a transaction, although they concede that "[v]oting rights do
serve, however, as a conceptual premise on which to build a requirement of disclosure." Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 300. In terms of financial theory, "apathetic" shareholders might be
regarded as taking a free ride on the research expenditures made by those whose actions they uncriti-
cally endorse. Since securities are fungible, the value of a security in a portfolio depends most of all on
the lack of correlation of its expected returns with the expected returns of other securities in the
portfolio. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 122-29 (1981); J.
VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 46-50 (6th ed. 1983). A shareholder holding a
diversified portfolio of stocks has good reason to accept any premium over market and reinvest the
proceeds in some other security. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 420 (1983) ("Because of the easy availability of the exit option through the stock market,
the rational strategy for dissatisfied shareholders in most cases . . . is to disinvest rather than incur
costs in attempting to bring about changes through the voting process.").
43. See Chazen, supra note 6, at 1449-50, 1466-77 (recommending use of independent negotia-
tors). The court in Weinberger has made the use of independent negotiators a virtual prerequisite:
"Since fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent, board
of directors acting upon the matter before them it is unfortunate that this course apparently was
neither considered nor pursued." 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (citations omitted).
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the likelihood that the transaction would be well considered."' But negoti-
ation will not necessarily result in a higher price than the controlling
shareholder would unilaterally offer to dispersed and disorganized minor-
ity shareholders.45 The give-and-take of arm's-length bargaining will pro-
duce an average or compromise price that might well be lower than the
marginal price needed to bring in a majority of the minority shares when
each shareholder votes independently.4 If minority approval is required
in addition to negotiation, the negotiated price will be higher whenever a
compromise price appears too low to bring in the last necessary share.
Thus, minority approval and negotiation together are more effective in
ensuring a fair and valid result than either alone.
47
The minority's vote is important not merely as a concession to share-
holders' rights of ownership and participation, but also as a means to es-
tablish value under uncertainty in the marketplace. If the minority's ap-
proval is not sought, or if it is invalidated by a subsequent finding of
fraud or misrepresentation, the court will need to determine whether the
44. The contrary impression of haste, carelessness, and mere neglect of minority interests has been
fatal to disputed transactions. Most recently, the court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d at 712,
found that the defendant had rushed the merger and failed to give its terms careful consideration.
45. Chazen points out that a controlling shareholder in arm's-length negotiations will generally
pay a lower price per share for the company's publicly-held shares than an outside buyer would pay
for the entire company, because the outsider would have to pay a control premium. Chazen, supra
note 6, at 1468. When a merger requires minority approval, the minority has a degree of control, and
therefore may command a higher price than would be paid to a minority lacking control. This pre-
mium is an adequate proxy for the minority's rightful share of the gains expected from the merger.
46. The price demanded by the last shareholder necessary to assemble a majority of the minority
must be paid to all of the shareholders who would have accepted a lower price as well as to those who
would have held out for a higher price. The average price will be lower than the marginal price if the
holdouts (who are usually individual investors) have fewer shares than other shareholders who are
willing to accept any price that would make them marginally better off. (This result is likely if a large
number of the shares are held by institutional investors with large, diversified portfolios, whose trans-
action costs are relatively low; such investors are the most likely to accept a low cash premium over
market and reinvest in other securities.) In this respect, minority approval of a take-out would resem-
ble a successful tender offer:
The tender offer's success will depend on the demand of the last necessary shareholder. The
higher cost of tender offers should reflect the tendency for individual shareholders bargaining
separately to demand more in the aggregate than an objective appraisal of the value of the
corporation would justify . . . [or than] might be determined in arm's-length negotiations.
Toms, supra note 13, at 557-58 (footnotes omitted).
47. If arm's-length negotiation is employed as an alternative to minority approval, the result
might be to relax the disclosure requirement and thus permit a divergence of state from federal stan-
dards of fairness. The Weinberger opinion can be read to imply that a controlling shareholder who
negotiates at arm's length with independent representatives of the minority shareholders no longer has
fiduciary duties to them and need not disclose his assessment of the transaction's value. 457 A.2d at
710-11 ("individuals who act in a dual capacity as directors of two corporations, one of whom is
parent and the other subsidiary, owe the same duty of good management to both corporations, and in
the absence of an independent negotiating structure. . . this duty is to be exercised in light of what is
best for both companies"; the duty includes the requirement of "complete candor") (emphasis added).
The court condemned the defendant in Weinberger for failing to disclose to the minority an internal
memorandum, prepared by two dual directors for the sole use of defendant, which indicated that the
defendant had been willing to pay four dollars per share more than it offered to the minority. Infor-
mation about a party's reservation price is usually concealed in arm's-length bargaining.
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price paid was a fair distribution of the value of the transaction. Ex ante,
that distribution can be determined only by a shareholder vote (an aggre-
gation of estimates); ex post, it can be determined only by a judicial ap-
proximation of the terms that reasonable shareholders in similar circum-
stances would have voted to accept, if given the chance. It is easier and
more equitable to give them the chance than to estimate after the fact
what they would have done with it.
CONCLUSION
"Fairness," judicially determined after the fact, is no substitute for a
free choice by the affected parties. The majority shareholder provides such
a choice when it submits a proposed take-out merger to a vote by the
minority shares whose removal it seeks. In this case, the price is indeed an
amount taken-if it is taken-in exchange, not compensation unilaterally
paid for a coercive exclusion.
Minority approval protects minority shareholders from unfair dealing,
thereby complementing the protection offered by state appraisal statutes
and by legal or equitable actions for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. It
also protects the controlling shareholder, as well as its shareholders, by
shifting the burden of proving unfairness to the dissidents. It further pro-
tects both sides by encouraging them to consider the terms of the transac-
tion more carefully than is necessary when the terms are unilaterally
imposed.
Minority approval also facilitates adjudication by shifting its emphasis
to the issue of disclosure; courts can more readily assess the adequacy of
disclosure than the substantive fairness of the price. By emphasizing dis-
closure, minority approval brings substantive state corporation law gov-
erning the fairness of take-out mergers into closer harmony with federal
law governing the sale and exchange of corporate securities, a central pur-
pose of which is to require disclosure as a means of protecting free and
informed choice. Thus a disputed transaction effected by a vote of the
minority shares permits a state or federal court of equity to employ the
concepts and insights of securities regulation in adjudicating disputed
take-out mergers.
-Kent T. van den Berg
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